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Abstract 
 
In this chapter we will review experimental evidence related to pharmacological moral 
enhancement. Firstly, we will present our recent study in which we found that a drug called 
propranolol could change moral judgements. Further research, which also investigated this, found 
similar results. Secondly, we will discuss the limitations of such approaches, when it comes to the 
idea of general “human enhancement”. Whilst promising effects on certain moral concepts might 
be beneficial to the development of theoretical moral psychology, enhancement of human moral 
behaviour in general – to our current understanding – has more side-effects than intended effects, 
making it potentially harmful. We give an overview of misconceptions when taking experimental 
findings beyond the laboratory and discuss the problems and solutions associated with the 
psychological assessment of moral behaviour. Indeed, how is morality “measured” in 
psychology, and are those measures reliable? 
 
1. Experimental Studies on Psychopharmacology and Human Morality 
 
Recently, studies have begun to elucidate the neural basis of human moral behaviour, 
including neural correlates of moral action and decision making.
1
 Initial studies used fMRI 
(functional magnetic resonance imaging) to determine areas of the brain associated with 
moral reasoning. In their widely-cited study, Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, and 
Cohen used fMRI to determine the underlying neural mechanisms of moral judgements.
2
 The 
study involved participants reading vignettes about moral dilemmas, such as the footbridge 
and the switch dilemma.
3
 The authors categorized dilemmas as either personal or impersonal 
based on features of the scenario (i.e., up-close versus distant, involving redirected versus 
direct harm, etc.). They found that personal dilemmas were more strongly associated with 
activations in brain regions involved in emotional processing (such as the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex) whereas impersonal dilemmas activated areas of working memory (such as 
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex). In addition, the type of judgement individuals made also  
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led to differences in brain activation patterns. Specifically, when making a utilitarian judgement 
(compared to a deontological judgement) in personal (but not impersonal) moral 
dilemmas, areas associated with cognitive control were found to be active, suggesting that 
individuals had to overcome an initial emotional evaluation in personal dilemmas in order 
to make a utilitarian decision in such cases. Greene, et al. therefore subsequently proposed a 
dual process theory of moral judgements in which certain dilemmas recruit immediate 
emotional reactions which can be in conflict with moral reflective “rational” analysis, and 
might require extra cognitive resources in order to arrive at a utilitarian decision. Further 
neuroscientific studies, using fMRI, have elaborated on these initial findings, generally 
supporting the view that certain features in moral dilemmas can trigger different brain 
processing areas. We understand that all human processes have their basis in the brain and 
therefore show correlations to brain activation patterns. As such, the new idea that the 
interfering effects of drugs on brain activity could manipulate not only basic brain functions 
but also have profound effects on higher order human processes such as moral decision-
making seems only logical.  
Drug effects are largely produced by interferences with neuronal transmission. Neurons 
use neurotransmitters to transfer information from one neuron to the next. At the synaptic 
cleft, the electric potential is transferred into a chemical signal by triggering the release of 
neurotransmitters into the synaptic cleft. The neurotransmitter then docks onto receptors of 
the post-synaptic cell membrane, triggering further intercellular mechanisms in the post-
synaptic neuron, which enables the signal to be transferred.
4
 Whilst the drug may interfere 
with multiple sites, one common mechanism is the blocking of receptors on the post-
synaptic cell membrane which subsequently blocks signal transfer. If it is expected that 
certain human behaviours are mediated by activity of a neurotransmitter to a great extent, 
then blocking the activity of this neurotransmitter with a pharmaceutical would reduce such 
“behaviour”. 
 
In our previous study, we had the hypothesis that one key neurotransmitter, namely 
noradrenaline (NA), might be involved in moral judgement and moral behaviour. NA has 
previously been suggested to be involved in basic emotion processing and is thought to 
underlie the fight-or flight response. In fact, early research has already determined that fear 
responses in animals were associated with elevated levels of NA.
5
 NA is transferred via alpha 
and beta receptors, peripherally and centrally. It has been suggested that emotional arousal 
should be reduced if NA receptors are blocked with a pharmaceutical.
6
 Indeed, beta-blockers 
(i.e., propranolol, which blocks beta 1 and 2 receptors) have been found to reduce effects of 
emotional arousal. For instance, reduced heart rate and general reduced activation can be 
observed after emotional stimuli with propranolol intervention.
7
 Therefore, propranolol has 
been prescribed not only as a first-line treatment for hypertension, but also as a means of 
reducing the effects of panic and anxiety. For example, propranolol is often prescribed for 
instances of performance anxiety, and for the prevention of the development of post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD). 
 
Crucially, if basic emotional arousal is also involved in higher order processes, such as our 
moral decision-making, then propranolol may also affect human morality.
7
 And this is 
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indeed what we found in a recent study. Participants either received a single oral dose of 
propranolol or a placebo tablet. When the drug action had reached its peak effect, the 
psychological tests were conducted. Participants’ heart rates were measured and a mood 
assessment was completed, followed by the moral dilemma test. In the morality task, 
participants judged the moral acceptability of a set of 20 moral dilemmas comprising both 
personal and impersonal scenarios including the footbridge and the switch dilemma. As 
predicted, we found that propranolol significantly reduced heart rate after the intervention but 
had no effect on self-reported mood. Importantly, participants in the propranolol group also 
judged harmful actions described in personal moral dilemmas as less morally acceptable, without 
changing the rating on impersonal moral dilemmas.
8
 This suggests that NA function is involved 
in the psychological process of moral decision making and that responses to personal moral 
dilemmas may rely on basic emotional processes. However, contrary to what would be predicted 
according to Greene’s theory, we found an increase in deontological or non-utilitarian 
judgements. We argue that, since NA is also involved in the processing of aggression, 
propranolol may have reduced aggression and subsequently increased harm aversion. 
 
This theory regarding harm aversion and its role in moral decision making has also been 
supported by further psychopharmacological research using the drug citalopram. Citalopram is a 
selective serotonin re-uptake inhibitor and increases the net brain concentration of serotonin. In 
previous studies, serotonin has been found to be involved in emotion regulation, and is thus also 
often used for the treatment of mood or anxiety disorders.
9
 In this study, Crockett, Clark, Hauser, 
and Robbins gave participants a single dose of citalopram in a double-blind placebo controlled 
study before assessing each participant’s moral judgements.10 Again, the authors found an effect 
of the drug on moral judgements, but only for personal dilemmas. Specifically, they found that 
citalopram increased deontological responses in these dilemmas, arguing that serotonin reuptake 
inhibition may have increased harm aversion. 
 
Apart from psychopharmacological manipulation of theoretical moral judgements, studies 
have also investigated wider moral behaviour and social attitudes, such as pro-social behaviour, 
generosity, and fairness judgements, as well as perceptions of out-group members.
11
 In numerous 
studies it has been found that pharmaceuticals produce effects on such human behaviours.
12
 For 
instance, oxytocin, a hormone associated with maternal care and bonding has been found to also 
increase fairness judgements, willingness to donate, and to help others
13
. In another recent 
study, we investigated the effect of propranolol on intergroup attitudes, using behavioural as  
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 well as combined fMRI methods.
14
 We first investigated racial biases using self-reporting as well 
as response-time based computer test methods (i.e., the IAT). The IAT measures racial biases by 
comparing response times between associations of in-and-out-group faces as well as positive and 
negative words. We found that propranolol reduced racial biases, suggesting that NA might be 
involved in the processing of social attitudes.
14
 More recently we repeated this study, but in 
addition also examined the effect of propranolol on racial face perception in the brain using 
fMRI.
14
 In this study, Caucasian participants received the pharmacological intervention before 
undergoing fMRI in which they viewed black and white faces. We found activation differences 
in the fusiform gyrus (a brain area strongly associated with face perception and social 
categorisation) with propranolol. This suggests that NA might be involved in basic face 
processing and immediate social categorisation in the brain. The above studies have illustrated 
that, besides having an effect on basic physiological processes, drugs can also influence higher 
order human social processes, such as theoretical moral judgements, judgements of fairness and 
generosity, as well as pro-social behaviour and social perception. Does this therefore mean that 
we can take drugs to enhance our morality? 
 
2. Psychopharmacological Effects “Outside” the Laboratory 
 
In neuroscience, when conducting experiments using pharmaceuticals, the idea is to 
investigate and learn more about the underlying neural mechanisms of certain concepts. For 
instance, as determined in our own research, we found that NA seems to play a significant and 
causal role in moral decision-making and social judgement. As such, these studies are 
theoretically driven. Attempts to find a drug which might be used to enhance our morality is less 
theoretical in nature; indeed, to our understanding, previous studies were not designed to test this 
latter idea, but rather to understand the neuroscience of higher order human processes. Indeed, 
whilst conducting these studies, we did not consider the concept of moral enhancement or if it 
was even possible. 
 
When conducting experimental research, the results reported are almost always average effects. 
For instance, even though we found that propranolol significantly reduced racial biases on the 
IAT test, this was only the case for the average of the group, meaning that racial biases were not 
reduced in every single individual. Secondly, several studies must be carried out before 
meaningful implications can be inferred. For instance, in a recent review we investigated the 
potential use of metabotropic glutamate receptor 5 antagonists for the treatment of anxiety.
15
 In 
this review we described that, before its application in humans, more than 800 animal studies 
were conducted. Indeed, in order to assume reliable pharmacological effects, a large number of 
experiments are required. 
 
It was also suggested that selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs) might be used to 
elevate or enhance mood in humans.
16
 In comparison to the limited number of pharmacological  
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studies on morality, numerous studies have been conducted on “mood enhancement”. A recent 
review examined the overall effect of SSRIs on mood.
17
 The authors found that SSRIs were 
only effective in changing mood in severe depression but not in moderate or mild depression, 
suggesting that mood enhancement is selective and   therefore not possible across individuals. 
Furthermore, it is often assumed that the effects of laboratory experiments can translate to the 
outside world, which may prove problematic. In particular, with regards to drug effects, the 
short and long term effects may vary. For instance, with regards to aggression reduction in 
association with propranolol, it was speculated that the effects of aggression reduction would 
disappear over time, whilst the ‘medical’ effect of reduced heart rate remained.18 
 
In addition, we would like to emphasise another factor associated with pharmacological 
intervention, which is the inevitability of side-effects. Previously, in ethics and philosophy, 
some articles discussing the prospect of pharmacological enhancement suggested that in the 
near future there may be a drug with no or negligible side effects.
19
 Other claims, such as the 
argument that taking a drug might not be different from other non-medical interventions 
might indeed be defensible, if the assumption that there will be a drug with no or negligible 
side effects were justified. For example, if we found a drug that could make you fly and 
nothing else, we would most likely take it. But it is not that straightforward. In fact, in our 
recent article we discussed why there is not currently, and likely will never be, a drug with no 
or negligible side effects.
20
 Side effects of most psychoactive substances range from allergic 
reactions to physical problems, but also to psychological side-effects including reduced sexual 
drive, increased anxiety, loss of attention, increased tiredness, or loss of motivation. From our 
current understanding of the brain, we know that interventions that do simply one thing and 
nothing else are not possible. The brain operates in complex networks. We cannot find one 
area for morality or one neurotransmitter regulating morality, or one drug that has only one 
effect on this complex network. In our recent article, we illustrated a case of simple visual edge 
detection in mice and described the potential side effects that ‘enhancing’ this seemingly simple 
function might elicit.
21
 The complexity demonstrated here with a process as simple as edge 
detection only emphasises the challenges of attempting to enhance a multifaceted phenomenon 
such as morality. Therefore, decisions regarding enhancement must be pragmatic evaluations of 
effect versus side effect. Crucially, in this pursuit of moral enhancement, we first need reliable 
measures of morality to determine whether there has been an effect, and this measure would 
need to prove meaningful outside of the laboratory. But do we have such reliable measures of 
morality? 
 
3. The Psychological Assessment of Morality and its Reliability 
 
In order to examine measures of morality, we must first look at the history of assessment 
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philosophy, grounded in theory rather than empirical investigation. It was the emergence of 
moral psychology that marked the fusion of both theoretical and experimental approaches in 
investigating the nature of morality, but more specifically, moral judgement.
22 
 
In line with the hybrid nature of moral psychology and as discussed above, provocative moral 
dilemmas pitting deontological against utilitarian theories have played a central role in the 
investigation of moral judgement.
23
 Both the footbridge and switch dilemmas,
24
 which are 
versions of the so-called “trolley problem”, have become a topic of interest for both moral 
philosophers and moral psychologists for the reason that individuals tend to endorse the 
utilitarian outcome in the switch dilemma but refuse to do so in the footbridge alternative.
25 
 
    At the methodological level, moral psychologists tend to present these trolley problems to 
participants in text-based paradigms that require a subsequent moral judgement. Typically, 
participants are asked whether the utilitarian act described in the dilemma is “appropriate” or 
“acceptable”. In their conception, these hypothetical moral dilemmas were not intended to reveal 
insights into real-life decisions but instead, in their experimental simplicity, allow moral 
scientists to explore the ‘foundational psychological processes that underlie human moral 
cognition’.26 The level of experimental control available to scientists in incorporating these 
paradigms is paramount; allowing moral conflicts to arise in artificial contexts with anonymous 
agents.
27
 Despite the prevalent use of these paradigms, concerns have been raised about the 
precision with which moral dilemmas have been constructed.
28
 Differences in several factors 
including framing, word count, perspective, situational circumstances, and type of question 
have been shown to influence moral judgements.
29
 For example, research has distinguished 
judgement questions such as ‘is it morally acceptable?’ from action-choice questions such as 
‘would you do it?’ Arguably, judgement questions address allocentric evaluations of the 
utilitarian act, whereas action-choice questions offer  an egocentric perspective, resulting in 
distinct moral judgements.
30 
In a well-known framing study, participants were found to endorse 
utilitarian outcomes when the phrasing “save” was used as opposed to “kill”.31  
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In addition to disagreement over the formulations of these moral dilemmas, research has also 
questioned the ability of these paradigms to reflect genuine deontological or utilitarian 
responses.
32
 For example, in the footbridge dilemma we have no clear method for distinguishing 
the action of pushing the man as (i) a moral decision grounded in the belief that killing one to save 
the majority is morally required, or as (ii) a decision driven simply by less aversion to harm.
33
 
Crucially, there is evidence to suggest that people possessing antisocial personality traits are more 
likely to push the man off the footbridge with their intentions masked as being utilitarian.
34
 
Further, research has found that even when controlling for this anti-social trait association, so-
called utilitarian responses do not always reflect concern for the ‘greater good’.35 
 
Despite these criticisms, recent attempts to validate moral dilemmas have addressed 
previous inconsistencies in formulation
36
 and previous attempts to label individuals as either 
utilitarian or deontological have been challenged with research arguing that people instead 
tend to adopt a ‘particularist’ approach to morals that takes the details of each case into 
account’.37 Whilst the methodology is valuable in shedding light on the mechanisms 
underlying moral judgements, there remain gaps in our understanding. How can declarations 
made in response to these text-based paradigms translate into real-world moral behaviour?
38 
 
Attempts to explicate moral behaviour have largely explored non-harmful actions in 
economical paradigms and so the investigation of harmful moral actions has made little 
headway.
39
 While text-based moral dilemmas possess an advantage in producing unambiguous 
outputs, these questionnaire-based paradigms ‘only offer a very low degree of immersion’.40 
In fact, FeldmanHall, et al. found that these contextually impoverished scenarios elicited 
moral decisions that were different from those made in real counterparts of the same 
scenario.
41 
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hypothetical scenario, the researchers were able to align hypothetical moral choices with real 
moral choices. This line of research would suggest that contextual richness alters moral 
decisions and raises further questions regarding the reliance on text-based moral dilemmas in 
moral psychology. Echoing the age-old saying “do as I say, not as I do”,42  this inconsistency 
between moral judgement and action is supported in research with institutionalised 




Taken together, this evidence of a partial dissociation between moral judgements and moral 
actions and the potential for contextual information to bridge the gap highlights the need for a 
contextually rich testing tool. Fortunately, the emergence of contextually salient virtual reality 
technologies has opened opportunities to explore simulated harmful moral actions in 
environments free from issues concerning de-contextualisation.
44
 Virtual reality systems 
adopt sensory-tracking, most commonly head-tracking, to immerse participants within life-size 
simulated environments. In these dynamic environments, researchers can begin to investigate 
active moral choices: ‘would someone […] actually resort to this course of action when the full 
repertoire of contextual features comes into play?’45 
 
In this virtual domain of moral psychology, attempts to reproduce moral dilemmas in virtual 
reality have revealed mixed findings regarding the relationship between moral judgement and 
action. While in virtually constructed versions of trolley-like dilemmas some research has 
demonstrated consistency between judgements in original text-based paradigms and simulated 
actions in virtual counterparts,
46
 contrasting research has demonstrated a disparity with 
greater utilitarian endorsements observed in virtual dilemmas.
47
 For example, in a recent study, 
we found that when individuals were required to simulate the harmful action of pushing the 
man off the bridge in a virtual simulation of the personal footbridge dilemma, the majority of 
people chose the utilitarian action.
48
 When faced with the text-based version of the dilemma, 
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on the other hand, the majority of people refused to endorse the utilitarian outcome. 
Arguably, the degree of contextual saliency and subsequent affective responses experienced in 
virtual moral dilemmas produces this discrepancy. 
 
Virtual reality systems offer considerable advantages. Unlike other research domains in 
which actions can be examined both in the laboratory and in the field, the domain of morality 
presents unique challenges; participants cannot be placed in real-world precarious situations.
49
 
While economic paradigms have begun to shed light on non-harmful actions, studies 
investigating morality of harm have remained largely non-behavioural for the reason that 
ethically harmful behaviours prove difficult to test.
50
 Although the incorporation of harm-
based moral dilemmas, whether text-based or virtual, is a somewhat limited approach, helping us 
to investigate ‘only a fragment of our moral psychology’, it is a ‘potentially significant one’.51 
The application of virtual reality to study harm-specific moral actions for example has 
significance for professions exposed to sensitive and emotionally arousing moral decision-
making on a regular basis.
52
 Emergency service professionals have begun to adopt virtual 
reality systems for several reasons. Not only does it offer full immersion, but it is also both cost-
effective and safe in contexts where there is little room for error.
53
 This application of virtual 
reality demonstrates its broader value, investigating real-world moral decision-making 
beyond that of hypothetical scenarios centred round normative theories. 
 
The level of “realism” available in virtual environments not only relies on visual saliency 
but also on “sensorimotor contingencies” or the congruence between motor actions and 
sensory simulation. Presently, virtual reality systems can only ‘offer crude approximations’ 
of sensorimotor contingencies and subsequent plausibility.
54
 Despite this shortcoming, 
research has shown that even basic virtual environments can elicit a range of realistic responses 
providing opportunities to bridge the “reality gap” in social domains. Essentially, if the virtual 
environment can deliver the subjective experience of “being there”, life-like thoughts and 
emotions can be prompted.
55
 Importantly, research demonstrates that virtual reality systems 
can offer successful collaboration between the experimental control available in laboratory 
settings and components of ecological validity in providing enhanced affective experiences.
56 
In fact, with regards to making virtual environments true to life, we face a paradox in research 
settings. Preserving the distinction between reality and virtual reality is essential for ethical 
reasons.
57
 If the boundary were to break down, then the potentially hazardous reasons for not 
evaluating moral choices in the field in the first place would become of concern in virtual 
reality paradigms.
58
 Despite the compromise here between bridging the reality gap and 
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preserving the technological boundary, virtual reality systems can generate experiences and 





To date, existing models of moral decision-making have been shaped with moral judgements in 
mind,
60
 offering little insight into moral actions. Although virtual research is in its infancy, by 
promoting “judicious use” of these virtual reality paradigms within moral psychology, we can 
begin to validate their potential in assessing morality. Crucially, the finding that moral 
judgements in text-based paradigms diverge from moral actions in virtual reality paradigms raises 
two key questions: (i) are moral judgement and moral action driven by at least partially distinct 
mechanisms and (ii) do immersive virtual environments reveal moral choices that are closer to 
real-life responses? In either stream, the incorporation and validation of both methods must 
continue to better our assessment of both moral judgements and actions; after all ‘by examining 
only one blade of a pair of scissors, one will not understand how scissors cut’.61 Only through 
adopting these multifaceted approaches to the study of morality can we begin to assess moral 





In this chapter we have demonstrated that psychopharmacological manipulation can in fact alter 
moral judgements
62
 as well as social behaviours and attitudes.
63
 In this sense, “morality” does 
appear susceptible to alteration and enhancement. However, many of the studies that we 
review were originally designed to unearth the underlying neural mechanisms responsible for 
such moral judgements and social behaviours, placing little focus on the concept of moral 
enhancement and short and long-term effects of drug use outside of the lab. When 
considering moral enhancement in this practical and pragmatic framework, we highlight two 
key areas in need of advancement. Firstly, there will likely never be a drug without side-effects.
64
 
As such, without first establishing control over or abolishing such harmful side-effects, we 
cannot yet advocate psychopharmacological-based moral enhancement. Secondly, given the 
multifaceted nature of morality as a construct and debates concerning the reliability of its 
measurement,
65
 we must first validate and refine its assessment prior to fully understanding 
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